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NOTE
THE GRAND STAIRCASE-ESCALANTE




On September 18, 1996, President Clinton issued a Proclama-
tion declaring one million seven hundred thousand acres of Fed-
eral land in Utah a national monument.' Invoking the Antiqui-
ties Act of 1906 (the "Act"), 2 the President added the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument to the Act's list of areas
declared national monuments. 3 This list includes the Grand Can-
yon, which was declared a national monument by Theodore
Roosevelt in 1908. 4 While the Proclamation has been dubbed by
many opponents as "[t]he mother of all land grabs," 5 and "a fla-
grant move to circumvent the legislative process concerning the
* J.D. 1997, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See Hillary Stout & Bruce Ingersoll, Clinton Shields Some U.S.
Lands in Utah From Development and Sets Policy Shift, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19,
1996, at A4.
2. 16 U.S.C. §§ 430-433 (1994).
3. See President William J. Clinton, President Clinton Delivers Remarks
at Grand Canyon National Park, Arizona, in NBC PROF. TRANSCRiPTs, Sept.
18, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11748680 [hereinafter Clinton, Grand
Canyon Remarks].
4. See Grand Canyon National Monument, Arizona, Proclamation
No. 794, 35 Stat. 2175 (Jan. 11, 1908); Proclamation No. 2022, 47 Stat.
2547 (Dec. 22, 1932); Proclamation No. 2393, 3 C.FR. 150 (1938-1943),
reprinted in 54 Stat. 2692 (Apr. 4, 1940).
5. Utah Delegation Blasts Clinton Move On Monument, CONGRESS
DArLY/A.M., Sept. 19, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11367575 [hereinafter
Utah Delegation] (quoting Senate Judiciary Chairman Orrin Hatch).
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designation of land to be set aside for wilderness," 6 the action is
neither unprecedented nor the Act's largest reservation of fed-
eral land.7 The relatively obscure Act has been used by past presi-
dents to declare national monuments of areas of historic,8 prehis-
toric,9 and scientific interest.10
While there has been much controversy over declarations of
national monuments under the Act, what effect, if any, the pres-
ent declaration will likely have upon the actual use and potential
for development of the land and its resources is yet to be seen.
Several aspects of the Proclamation appear to qualify the possible
effects of the reservation under the Act.
This Note will examine the presidential use and judicial inter-
pretation of the Antiquities Act of 1906, with regard to reserva-
tions made under the Act which do not qualify as historic or pre-
historic sites, but would be better categorized as scenic or
conservation efforts. Part I will briefly examine the use and judi-
cial interpretations of the Act that have served to expand it be-
yond Congress' original intent. Part II will examine the recent
proclamation of President Clinton declaring the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument in Utah a national monument.
This Note will examine what effects, if any, the Proclamation
may have on the area in terms of the management and future
6. Clinton Administration 'Surprises' Andalex On Utah Coal Project,
COAL W., Sept. 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8590376 [hereinafter Ad-
ministration 'Surprises' Andalex] (quoting Richard L. Lawson, President,
Nat'l Mining Ass'n).
7. See infra Part I.E.
8. See, e.g., Edison Laboratory Nat'l Monument, New Jersey, Proc-
lamation No. 3148, 3 C.FR. 86 (1954-1958 Comp.), reprinted in 70 Stat.
c49 (1956) (later redesignated together with Edison Home National
Historic Site and adjacent lands as Edison National Historical Site by
Pub. L. No. 87-628, 1, 76 Stat. 428 (1962)).
9. See, e.g., Dinosaur National Monument, Utah, Proclamation
No. 1313, 39 Stat. 1752 (1915) (expanded into Colorado in Proclama-
tion No. 2290, 3 C.ER. 36 (1938-1943)). For a discussion of the Antiqui-
ties Act and the preservation of paleontological resources, see David J.
Lazerwitz, Bones of Contention: The Regulation of Paleontological Resources
on the Federal Public Lands, 69 IND. LJ. 601, 609-11 (1994).
10. See, e.g., Devil's Tower Nat'l Monument, Wyoming, Proclama-
tion No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1906).
THE ANTIQUITIES ACT
uses of the land and the resources contained therein. This Note
will conclude that, despite the charges of overreaching of presi-
dential authority, it would appear that the Proclamation was a
valid use of the Act. However, the limiting language of the Proc-
lamation issued by President Clinton, should it be implemented,
effectively serves to negate many of the protections monument
status would provide. Thus, the declaration appears to be neither
an abuse of presidential authority nor a great act to protect the
natural wonders of the monument area. While the impact on the
land remains to be seen, the President's declaration may greatly
affect the Antiquities Act itself. Thus, a limit on future uses of
the Act may be the true legacy of the Grand Staircase-Escalante
National Monument.
I. THE ANTIQUITIES AcT OF 1906
A. The Act and the Legislative History
The Antiquities Act of 1906 reads:
The President of the United States is authorized, in his discre-
tion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, his-
toric and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or
scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or
controlled by the Government of the United States to be na-
tional monuments, and may reserve as a part thereof parcels of
land, the limits of which in all cases shall be confined to the
smallest area compatible with the proper care and management
of the objects to be protected. When such objects are situated
upon a tract covered by a bona fide unperfected claim or held
in private ownership, the tract, or so much thereof as may be
necessary for the proper care and management of the object,
may be relinquished to the Government, and the Secretary of
the Interior is authorized to accept the relinquishment of such
tracts in behalf of the Government of the United States."
The text of the Act provides neither specific procedure to de-
clare a national monument, nor judicial review of a president's
declaration of an area as a national monument.12
The legislative history of the Antiquities Act makes it clear that
the original intent of Congress in enacting the Act was to pre-
11. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1995).
12. See Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President's Statutory
Powers, 68 VA. L. REv. 1, 37 (1982).
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serve objects of antiquity.3 Archeological organizations lobbied
several years for the Act, seeking to preserve "aboriginal antiqui-
ties located on federal lands." 14 However, the Department of the
Interior lobbied for the inclusion of scientific and scenic areas
within the Act, as well. Congress rejected the broader version of
the Act, but was unable to pass the more limited proposal that
would have protected only acts of antiquity "because of bureau-
cratic delays and disagreements between museums and universi-
ties seeking authority to excavate ruins on public lands."15 The fi-
nal bill was drafted by a prominent archeologist who was
primarily interested in protecting prehistorical antiquities, but
later broadened the draft to include the phrase "other objects of
historic or scientific interest."16 The final draft also differed from
earlier versions in that it did not specifically limit the amount of
land that could be reserved, instead including the direction that
the areas set aside should be confined to "the smallest area com-
patible with the proper care and management of the objects to
be protected."' 7 Notwithstanding the absence of any spacial limits
to the Act, Congress apparently intended that the area reserved
be limited."8
Despite the original intent of the Act, it is clear that its use has
been expanded beyond merely protecting areas of historic or
prehistoric interest. Notwithstanding the fact that "[n]othing in
the Act authorizes the creation of national monuments for scenic
purposes or for general purposes of land conservation," 19 the Act
13. "Antiquities" are defined as "relics, monuments, etc. of the dis-
tant past." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 61 (3d ed. 1988).
14. Richard M. Johannsen, Public Land Withdrawal Policy and the
Antiquities Act, 56 WASH. L. REv. 439, 450 (1981) (citing R. Lee, THE AN-
TIQUITIEs ACT OF 1906, at 59-62 (1970)). The Johannsen article as a
whole offers an unusually comprehensive discussion of the Antiquities
Act.
15. Id.
16. See id. The importance of adding this phrase to the final ver-
sion of the Antiquities Act can be seen in the court's focus upon the
clause to conclude that Congress intended a broader grant of authority
to reserve areas other than merely areas of historic and prehistoric in-
terest. See Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1853, 1854 (D. Alaska July 1, 1980).
17. Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1995).
18. SeeJohannsen, supra note 14, at 450.
19. Id. at 450-51 n.85. The Chief Clerk of the General Land Office
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has been repeatedly used as such, beginning with the initial use
by President Theodore Roosevelt.
"[S]ince President Roosevelt promptly, by Proclamation, exer-
cised his authority [to reserve land for conservation purposes],
• . . that declaration of authority . . . established a pattern
which has been followed by those who have occupied the office
since. For 57 years that pattern has followed that broad exercise
of presidential authority first announced by President Roosevelt
"20
B. The Grand Canyon and the First Test of The Antiquities Act
President Theodore Roosevelt was the first President to with-
draw land under the Act, reserving 818,560 acres as early as 1908
to create the Grand Canyon National Monument.21 This created
a precedent which other presidents later followed to create simi-
larly large scenic national monuments under the Act.22
Roosevelt's declaration led to the first test of the Act as a
means of preserving areas for scenic or conservation purposes.
In Cameron v. United States,23 the Supreme Court upheld the au-
thority of the President to declare the Grand Canyon a national
monument under the Act. The Court stated that the Act empow-
ered the President to reserve land "of historic or scientific inter-
est."24 The Court found that the Grand Canyon qualified under
this portion of the Act as "the greatest eroded canyon in the
United States, if not in the world, . . . [which] has attracted wide
attention among explorers and scientists, affords an unexampled
was quoted during the first National Park Conference in 1911 as fol-
lows: "[The] terms of the [Antiquities Act] do not specify scenery, nor
remotely refer to scenery as a possible raison d'etre for a public reser-
vation." (citing R. Lee, THE ANTIQUITIES ACT OF 1906, at 109 (1970),
quoting F Bond, The Administration of National Monuments, in Proceedings
of the National Park Conference held at Yellowstone National Park, Sept. 11-
12, 1911, at 80-81 (1912)).
20. Anaconda Copper, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1854.
21. See Grand Canyon National Monument, supra note 3; Johann-
sen, supra note 14, at 452 & n.92 and accompanying text. This, how-
ever, was not the first withdrawal of land under the Act. In 1906, Presi-
dent Roosevelt created Devil's Tower National Monument, containing
1,153 acres. See Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1906).
22. See Johannsen, supra note 14, at 452.
23. 252 U.S. 450, 455-56 (1920).
24. Id. at 455 (quoting the Act).
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field for geologic study, [and] is regarded as one of the great
natural wonders .... 25 With these words the Court apparently
approved the use of the Act for scenic and conservation pur-
poses. Considering the fact that this would seemingly expand the
Act beyond the original intent, it is surprising to note that this
portion of the decision by the Supreme Court comprised only
two paragraphs. 26
The Supreme Court's primary concern in Cameron was a
defendant who allegedly established a mining claim in the area
of the monument. In Cameron, the Court found that the inclu-
sion of certain lands in a national monument withdrew that part
"from the operation of the mineral land law, but there was a sav-
ing clause in respect of any 'valid' mining claim theretofore ac-
quired."27 The Court laid out a test to determine if the mining
claim would fall within the savings clause of the Act:
To make the claim valid, or to invest the locator with a right to
the possession, it was essential that the land be mineral in char-
acter and that there be an adequate mineral discovery within
the limits of the claim as located .... and to bring the claim
within the savings clause in the withdrawal for the monument
reserve the discovery must have preceded the creation of that
reserve.2
While a valid mining claim gives the possessor certain rights,
the Secretary of the Interior has the power to determine the va-
lidity of a claim "after proper notice and upon adequate hearing
.. .."29 In Cameron, a hearing was held to determine whether a
patent for the claim should have been issued shortly after the
area was reserved as a monument.30 The Secretary determined
that there had been no adequate mineral discovery in the area,
and that no evidence had been presented that would show the
existence of a valuable mineral deposit. Consequently, the Secre-
tary stated that no valid claim was made prior to the establish-
ment of the monument.3' The Court upheld the Secretary's deci-
25. Id. at 456.
26. See id. at 455-56.
27. Id. at 455.
28. Id. at 456 (internal citations omitted).
29. Id. at 460.
30. See id. at 456.
31. See id. at 461.
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sion and his authority to make such a decision. The claim did
not fall within the savings clause of the Act, because no valid
claim existed prior to the establishment of the monument.3 2
C. Jackson Hole National Monument
Perhaps more important than the Supreme Court's decision in
Cameron was the litigation surrounding the Jackson Hole Na-
tional Monument in Wyoming v. Franke,33 which dealt with the
scope of the President's power under the Act.
In 1943, President Franklin Roosevelt created the Jackson Hole
National Monument 4 This action was bitterly opposed by some
within Congress and by the State of Wyoming. 35 The State of Wy-
oming brought suit in District Court charging, among other
things, that "an attempt has been made to substitute, through
the Antiquities Act, a National Monument for a National Park,
the creation of which is within the sole province of the Congress,
thereby becoming an evasion of the law governing the segrega-
tion of areas."36 The court held that it cannot "take any judicial
interest in the motives which may have inspired the Proclama-
tion described as an attempt to circumvent the Congressional in-
tent and authority in connection with such lands."37 "Such dis-
cussions are of public interest but are only applicable as an
appeal for Congressional action."38
The plaintiffs also claimed that the area designated as a na-
tional monument did not include any objects of historical or sci-
entific interest. 39 The court stated that while there was conflicting
evidence as to whether there really were any objects of scientific
or historical interest, "[i]f there be evidence in the case of a sub-
stantial character upon which the President may have acted in
32. See id. at 457-65.
33. 58 F Supp. 890 (D. Wyo. 1945).
34. Proclamation No. 2578, 3 C.ER. 327 (1938-1943), rePrinted in 57
Stat. 731 (1943). This was later abolished and incorporated in Grand
Teton National Park. 16 U.S.C. § 406(d-1).
35. SeeJohannsen, supra note 14, at 453.
36. Franke, 58 F Supp. at 892.
37. Id. at 896.
38. Id. at 897.
39. See id. at 895.
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declaring that there were objects of historic or scientific interest
included within the area, it is sufficient upon which he may have
based a decision." 40 If there was evidence that the area contained
no "objects of historic or scientific interest, the action in at-
tempting to establish it by proclamation as a monument, would
undoubtedly be arbitrary and capricious and clearly outside the
scope and purpose of the Monument Act."41 The court held that
there was sufficient evidence in this case that the area contained
objects of scientific or historical interest worthy of protection,
and even though the court may agree with the plaintiff, if there
is sufficient evidence to satisfy the "preponderance rule," the
"[c]ourt is bound."42 Thus, having found that the Proclamation
fell within the scope of the Act, the court deferred to the Presi-
dent's determination that the area contained "other objects of
historic or scientific interest" after a very limited review of the
facts presented.4 3
In deciding whether the President's action was authorized
under the Act, the court stated that the Proclamation was based
upon the President exercising a power given to him by Congress,
and therefore,
[f]or the judiciary to probe the reasoning which underlies this
Proclamation would amount to a clear invasion of the legisla-
tive and executive domains. Under the Constitution it is exclu-
sively for Congress, or those to whom it delegates authority, to
determine what tariffs shall be imposed. Here the President ac-
ted in full conformity with the statute. No question of law is
raised when the exercise of his discretion is challenged.44
Thus, the court held that the judiciary should not interfere in a
conflict between the executive and legislative branches of the
federal government.45
Concerning the area that had been reserved under the procla-
mation, the court went on to state: "[W]hat has been said with
reference to the objects of historic and scientific interest applies
40. Id. at 895.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 896.
43. Id. at 894-96. See also Johannsen, supra note 14, at 456.
44. Franke, 58 F. Supp. at 896 (quoting United States v. George S.
Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 380 (1940)).
45. See id.
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equally to the discretion of the Executive in defining the area
compatible with the proper care and management of the objects
to be protected. '46 Thus, it would appear that the deference
given to a President's proclamation that the area contains histori-
cal or scientific objects also applies to the decision of how much
area is necessary for the monument.
D. Devil's Hole and the Reservation of Water Rights
The next challenge to a reservation made for conservation
purposes under the Act came thirty-one years later, in 1952,
when President Truman created Devil's Hole National Monu-
ment.47 The Proclamation notes the "remarkable underground
pool" and the preamble mentions the unique features of the
pool, which contains a "peculiar race of desert fish."48 When
landowners who lived near Devil's Hole applied in 1970 for a
permit to change the use of the water in several wells, a repre-
sentative on behalf of the Park Service protested, stating that a
study should be conducted to determine if the change would af-
fect the water levels of Devil's Hole, which had declined.49 The
landowners admitted that they drew water from the same source
as Devil's Hole, but asserted that the reservation of the area by
the creation of the Devil's Hole National Monument did not af-
fect the water rights. 50
In Cappaert v. United States, the Supreme Court stated:
[T]his court has long held that when the Federal Government
withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a
federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves ap-
purtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to
accomplish the purpose of the reservation.51
This right was found to vest on the date of the reservation.5 2
However, the Court declared that when deciding whether there
46. Id. at 896.
47. It was actually added to the Death Valley National Monument
under Proclamation No. 2961, 3 C.F.R. 147 (1949-1953), reprinted in 66
Stat. c18 (1952).
48. Id.
49. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 134 (1976).
50. See id. at 135.
51. Id. at 138.
52. See id.
1997]
722 FORDHAM ENIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII
is an implicit water right when land is reserved by the Federal
Government, "the issue is whether the Government intended to
reserve unappropriated and thus available water."53 In the case of
the Devil's Hole National Monument, it was clear that this was
the government's intention, since the Proclamation discussed the
pool contained in Devil's Hole.5 The Court qualified its holding
by stating that "[t] he implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine,
however, reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill
the purpose of the reservation, no more."55 Despite the limiting
language of the statement, this would once again appear to leave
the decision up to the President's discretion. It is unclear
whether, if ever challenged, a court would ever find that the gov-
ernment exceeded its implied reservation of water rights needed
to maintain a monument area.
E. The Alaska Withdrawals
In 1978, President Carter created fifteen new national monu-
ments, consisting of fifty-six million acres of land in Alaska.56 "In
one day, President Carter withdrew over four and a half times as
much public land as the total land withdrawn under the Antiqui-
ties Act by all prior Presidents in seventy-two years."57 This with-
drawal came while Congress was attempting to pass land legisla-
tion to protect the areas in question. 58 Thus, the action was
largely viewed as designed for conservation purposes rather than
for preserving an area of historical or scientific interest.59 Presi-
dent Carter's proclamation is considered by some to have been
unprecedented and "an alarming extension of a disfavored stat-
ute already extended well beyond Congress' original intent."60
The land withdrawal was, of course, challenged.
53. Id. at 139.
54. See id. at 139-40.
55. Id. at 141.
56. Proclamation Nos. 4611-27, 3 C.F.R 69-104 (1979), reprinted in
93 Stat. 1446-75 (1979). For a list of monuments created by President
Carter and their respective acreage, seeJohannsen, supra note 14, at 454
n.114.
57. Johannsen, supra note 14, at 455.
58. See id. at 453-54, 453 n.112.
59. See id. at 455 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. at 455-56.
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1. NEPA Impact Assessment and the Antiquities Act
In Alaska v. Carter,61 the State of Alaska sought a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the government from closing the comment
period on an environmental impact statement ("EIS"). 62 In de-
ciding whether the State of Alaska had shown the probability of
success on the merits, it was necessary to decide whether the EIS
requirements applied to the Presidential Proclamation. 63 The
court held that the President is not required to file an impact
statement, as required under the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 ("NEPA"). 64 The government contended that NEPA's
EIS requirement only applied to "federal agencies." The govern-
ment argued, and the court found persuasive, that the President
is not a "federal agency" under NEPA, and therefore the EIS re-
quirement did not apply to reservations made by presidential au-
thority.65 When Congress wished to impose duties upon the Presi-
dent, "that office was specifically mentioned." 66 The court noted
that no precedents had been brought before the court "that
hold that the President must file an environmental impact state-
ment prior to acting under a specific delegation of Congres-
sional authority such as is embodied in the Antiquities Act.
Moreover, the doctrine of separation of powers prevents this
court from lightly inferring a Congressional intent to impose
such a duty on the President."67
While the State of Alaska conceded at oral argument that pres-
idential actions under the Act are not subject to NEPA, they ar-
gued that the involvement of the Secretary of the Interior in the
decision triggered the NEPA EIS requirements. The court found
61. 462 F. Supp. 1155, 1160 (D. Alaska 1978).
62. See id. at 1156.
63. See id. at 1158. The court also decided whether the require-
ments applied to reservations made by the Secretary of the Interior. See
id. at 1160-61.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (1995). Under NEPA, agencies of the
Federal government are required to prepare a detailed impact state-
ment for legislative proposals and "other major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment." Id.
§ 4332(2) (C).
65. See Carter, 462 F. Supp. at 1159-60.
66. Id. at 1160.
67. Id.
1997]
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the argument "absurd," since it would imply that the President
would have to file papers and decide boundaries on his own to
avoid the NEPA procedural requirements. 68 The court cited Arti-
cle II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution as the authority for
the President to obtain opinions regarding subjects relating to
his duties.69
For a court to require that an [EIS] must be filed after the
specified comment period before the President could receive
the recommendations of the Secretary would raise serious con-
stitutional questions. A familiar maxim of statutory construction
is that 'when one interpretation of a statute would create a sub-
stantial doubt as to the statute's constitutional validity, the
courts will avoid that interpretation absent a clear statement of
a contrary legislative intent.'70
To hold that NEPA procedural requirements are triggered when
a president requests recommendations from the Secretary would
burden and inhibit "the policy of open, frank discussion between
subordinate and chief concerning administrative action." 71 Thus,
the court held that such recommendations do not come under
the NEPA EIS process.72
2. Challenge Based Upon Size of the Withdrawal and the
Contravention of the Definition of the Act Itself
In Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 73 the Anaconda Copper Com-
pany, joined by the State of Alaska, challenged the land with-
drawal by President Carter. The case is significant, despite the ul-
timate mootness of the claims,74 due to the court's recognition
68. See id.
69. See id. Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution reads
"[The President] may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principle
Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject relat-
ing to the Duties of their respective offices...."
70. Id. (quoting United States v. Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1337
(D.C. Cir. 1971)).
71. Id. (quoting Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 87 (1973)).
72. See id.
73. 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853 (D. Alaska 1980).
74. Congress passed the Alaska National Interest Lands Conserva-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. & 43 U.S.C.), which disposed of the re-
THE ANTIQUITES ACT
that "an initially vague statute can gain content over time
through an interplay of executive and congressional action
.. "' The President's action which was in dispute in Anaconda
Copper exceeded any prior withdrawals under the Antiquities Act.
Some commentators suggested that the court should have re-
viewed whether the President exceeded the bounds of implied
congressional consent.76 "This inquiry would recognize that once
courts approve a practice as authorized by implication, Presi-
dents may be tempted to test the outer limits."77 The court, how-
ever, stated that Presidents had in the past used the Act expan-
sively and the courts, including the Supreme Court, had
approved of the expansive use of the Act.78 Despite the fact that
Congress knew of the expansive use of the Act, they had appar-
ently acquiesced to such an expansion, as shown by their legisla-
tive inaction.79 The court stated, however, that they were "not at
this time deciding whether the authority of the President might
have been exceeded in the area encompassed within the Procla-
mations now before us."80 Instead, the court's review was limited
to whether the Proclamations on their face exceeded the author-
ity with reference to the objects that may properly be preserved
under the Act.81 The court found the proclamations sufficient to
meet the requirements of the Act, concluding that ecological
served land that was challenged before certain factual issues, such as
the size of the area reserved, was decided. See Bruff, supra note 12, at
38 n.162.
75. Bruff, supra note 12, at 38-39.
76. See id. at 39.
77. Id.
78. See Anaconda Copper, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1855. The
court cited Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920), discussed supra
Part I.B, and Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), discussed
supra Part I.D.
79. See Anaconda Copper, 14 Env't. Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1855. The
court finds persuasive that Congress had an opportunity in 1976, when
it passed the Federal Land Management and Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 94-
579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1701-84 (1982))
to restrict presidential authority under the Antiquities Act and did not.
See Anaconda Copper, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1854.
80. 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1854.
81. See id.
1997]
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and geological areas could be declared monuments under the
Act.8
2
"Anaconda Copper's added element is the willingness to read
significance into congressional inaction when a visible executive
practice, supported by judicial precedents, is not disturbed by
Congress when it revises the statutes that govern closely related
matters."8 3 This statement may be what will prompt Congress to
pass some sort of legislation to modify the Antiquities Act in the
next few years in response to President Clinton's recent
proclamation.
Another significant point in the Anaconda Copper decision is
the court's statement regarding the limits of the President's au-
thority under the Act. While explaining the limit of their inquiry
in the case, the court stated:
[t]he parameters of presidential authority have not yet been
fully defined. The Supreme Court has had the opportunity to
do so in the Cameron case and again in Cappaert, but did not do
so. And so I may say that I believe there are limitations on the
exercise of presidential authority on the Antiquities Act. The
outer parameters have not yet been drawn by judicial
decision.84
Although the court decided that the Proclamations do not vio-
late the statute, the court reasoned that it has yet to be decided
when a president may in fact exceed presidential authority under
the Act. Thus, aside from Congressional action that may serve to
limit the President's future authority under the Act, the reserva-
tions by President Clinton may serve as a basis for an attempt at
a judicial pronunciation of the limits of presidential authority
under the Act.85
82. See id. at 1855.
83. Bruff, supra note 12, at 38 (italics added).
84. Anaconda Copper, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1854.
85. This, however, would seem unlikely if Congress fails to curtail
presidential authority since the court may once again presume acquies-
cence by congressional silence, thus concluding that the President had
not exceeded the authority delegated by Congress. Several lawsuits
have been filed in response to the proclamation. See Jim Woolf, New
Suit Challenges Utah Monument, SALT LAKE T~iB., Nov. 6, 1997, at Al
[hereinafter Woolf, New Suit].
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II. UTAH LAND WITHDRAWALS
A. The Proclamation
The reservation of 1.7 million acres of land in Utah by Presi-
dent Clinton in September 1996 is the most recent withdrawal of
land under the Antiquities Act. By creating the Grand Staircase-
Escalante National Monument, President Clinton has stirred up
interest in the Act, and much controversy regarding the reserva-
tion. Possible court actions and charges that the declaration was
mere election year politics have been aimed at the President's ac-
tion. In his speech declaring the Grand Staircase-Escalante Na-
tional Monument, President Clinton attempted to draw a parallel
between the current reservation and that made by President The-
odore Roosevelt when he created the Grand Canyon National
Monument. 6 However, given the controversy and the possible
challenges, it would have been perhaps better compared to the
reservations made by President Franklin Roosevelt in creating
the Jackson Hole National Monument and President Carter's
Proclamations creating the various national monuments in
Alaska.8 7 Nonetheless, there are some characteristics of the Proc-
lamation that distinguish it from previous land withdrawals.
It is obvious from the Proclamation itself that it was tailored to
meet the requirements of the Act and the cases that have previ-
ously interpreted it. In declaring the national monument, Presi-
dent Clinton highlighted the geological, historical, and archeo-
logical features of the area that would justify declaring it a
national monument.88 In addition, the Proclamation stated that
the 1.7 million acres reserved in the proclamation is "the small-
est area compatible with the proper care and management of
the objects to be protected."8 9 Thus, on its face, the proclama-
tion would appear to pass judicial scrutiny under Wyoming v.
86. The President, in his speech given at the edge of the Grand
Canyon declaring the National Monument stated "[i]t was President
Roosevelt's wisdom and vision that launched the Progressive Era and
prepared our Nation for the 20th century. Today, we must do the same
for the 21st century." Clinton, Grand Canyon Remarks, supra note 3.
87. See supra Part I.B-C & E for the discussion of these withdrawals.
88. See Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996).
89. Id. at 50,225.
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Franke9° and Anaconda Copper v. Andrus.91
However, it should be noted that the court in Anaconda Copper
expressed concern with the amount of area reserved by procla-
mation in Alaska, but stated that the Supreme Court had had
the opportunity but failed to limit Presidential authority under
the Act.92 The court stated that it did "believe there are limita-
tions," but, because that issue was beyond the scope of the lim-
ited inquiry before them, these limits on presidential authority
under the Act have yet to be defined.9 3 While this would appear
to open a door to challenge President Clinton's Proclamation
based upon its size,94 Congress' failure to restrict presidential au-
thority after the Alaskan withdrawals may once again be held to
be a tacit approval of the extension of presidential authority
under the Act.
B. Effect On Uses
All Federal lands and interests in lands within the boundaries
of this monument are hereby appropriated and withdrawn from
entry, location, selection, sale, leasing, or other disposition
under the public land laws, other than by exchange that fur-
thers the protective purposes of the monument. Lands and in-
terests in lands not owned by the United States shall be re-
served as a part of the monument upon acquisition of title
thereto by the United States.9
90. See 58 F. Supp. 890, 895 (D. Wyo. 1945); see discussion supra
Part I.C.
91. 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853, 1853 (D. Alaska 1980). See dis-
cussion supra Part I.E.2.
92. See Anaconda Copper, 14 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1854.
93. See id.
94. A court challenge disputing the legality of the size has in fact
been mounted. See Woolf, New Suit, supra note 85.
95. Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223, 50,225 (1996).
The terms "withdrawal" and "reservation," both used in the proclama-
tion, have some significance. In the realm of federal land management,
[t]hese two [terms have] historically had different meanings.
A 'withdrawal' merely removed lands or resources from dis-
position, while a 'reservation' committed the federal lands to
a specific purpose. Although the difference may seem purely
theoretical, 'reserved' water rights might attach only to lands
that have been 'reserved,' and not to those withdrawn. These
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The Proclamation states that it applies only to federal lands
and will be open to multiple use to the public. 96 In addition, the
Proclamation provides that "[n]othing in this proclamation shall
be deemed to affect existing permits or leases for, or levels of,
livestock grazing on Federal lands within the monument; existing
grazing uses shall continue to be governed by applicable laws
and regulations other than this proclamation." 97 Aside from the
statements in the Proclamation itself that would seem to guaran-
tee the continued, unchanged right to use of the land by the
public, uses such as grazing and recreation are not likely to be
affected. 98 This is because the area was previously under Bureau
of Land Management ("BLM") supervision, and they are also
charged with the future management of the area.99
While the monument designation will not limit recreation and
other existing uses, it may affect the area by increasing the num-
ber of tourists who will travel to see the newly created monu-
ment. The local governments will have to deal with the problems
associated with the increase in tourism, such as providing emer-
gency services and increased law enforcement personnel.100 This
increase in tourism will undoubtedly cause a strain upon local
governments and be yet another area in which the federal gov-
ernment will have to work with the local community to find an
adequate solution.
C. Management of the Monument
One important aspect of the Proclamation that distinguishes it
from previous land withdrawals under the Act is the fact that the
monument will be managed by the BLM, who previously man-
rights arise when water [is] necessary to fulfill the purposes
for which lands have been set aside.
Maria E. Mansfield, A Primer Of Public Land Law, 68 WASH. L. REv. 801,
821-22 (1993) (citations omitted).
96. See Clinton, Grand Canyon Remarks, supra note 3.
97. Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,225 (1996).
98. "Hunting, fishing and grazing will continue under existing
law." Utah Delegation, supra note 5.
99. Id.
100. See The Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument Oversight
Hearing, Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Parks and Public Lands, 105th Cong.
(1997) (statement of Louise Liston, County Commissioner, Garfield
County, Utah).
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aged the federal land. Most federal monuments are administered
by the. National Park Service, and this agreement is seen as a
concession to those who opposed the proclamation. 10 1
The Proclamation places the land under management of the
Secretary of the Interior through the BLM. 1°2 The Secretary has
three years to prepare a management plan and "promulgate
such regulations for its management as he deems appropriate."103
Thus, any future use of the land, whether it be recreational or
developmental, would be subject to BLM procedures and any
regulations which may be drawn up specifically for the site. Con-
gress directed the Secretary of the Interior to submit a report by
February 1, 1997, "that details the costs associated with the mon-
ument, the process for developing a management plan, and a
description of how affected parties will be involved in the process
for developing the management plan." 1°4 This directive echoes
many of the concerns and criticisms of the Proclamation within
and outside of Congress.105 Since there was no public hearing or
notice of the Proclamation (none is required by the statute),
there has been a call for the participation of public and local of-
ficials in the planning and management of the monument. 1°
101. See id.; see also Sheryl Morris, BLM Forms Team To Address Man-
agement Issues At Utah Monument, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FED. LANDS, Oct.
21, 1996, at 13, available in 1996 WL 14072454.
102. See Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,225 (1996).
103. Id. at 50,225.
104. 142 CONG. REc. H1l,644-01, H11,917 (1996). The BLM's
budget request included an additional $5 million for the added visita-
tion and planning. See 1998 Budget: Administration Requests $7.5 Billion in
Fiscal 1998 Funding For Department, Nat'l Env't Daily (BNA) (Feb. 7,
1997).
105. "The Administration recently created the Grand Staircase /
Canyons of the Escalante National Monument without consultation
with the Congress and without public comment." 142 CONG. REc. at
H11,916.
106. "[T]he President chose to ignore his high public trust by uni-
laterally turning a huge part of our state into a national monument.
[Having] ignored this basic obligation .... [he] now has the greater
responsibility to carry out the next phase of this discussion with mean-
ingful public involvement and process so that the best results can be
achieved." Administration 'Surprises' Andalex, supra note 6 (quoting Utah
Governor Leavitt).
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D. Effect on Valid Oil, Gas and Mining Claims Already in Existence
One of the major areas of contention concerning the Procla-
mation is the existing mining claims contained within the monu-
ment area. While the Proclamation withdraws the area from fur-
ther leasing, it acknowledges that "[t]he establishment of this
monument is subject to valid existing rights."1 0 7 In response to
concerns from Senator Robert Bennett, Interior Secretary Bruce
Babbitt wrote a letter addressing the effects of the Proclamation
regarding mining in the area.
[T]he only mineral interests of any significance I am aware of
in the area are existing federal coal leases issued many years
ago. Most of these leases have expired of their own terms, or
have been relinquished, or are in the process of being canceled
pursuant to law.... Two leases or lease groups remain."3 8
At the time of the Proclamation, at least one of the entities hold-
ing a valid coal lease had agreed to a land swap. PacifiCorp, an
electrical power generator, volunteered to swap its leases, which
would have been unexploitable due to the fact that the land had
been classified as a wilderness study area1°9
Another company with a valid existing lease is Andalex Re-
sources Corp. °10 Andalex, a developer of a coal mining project in
the section known as the Kaiparowitz Plateau, has been working
with BLM for years and is currently in the final stages of an EIS
regarding the development of a coal mine in the area. Had Pres-
107. Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996). Although
the Supreme Court did deal with mining rights and reservations under
the Antiquities Act in Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920),
the case dealt only with claims that had not been validly established
before the withdrawal, and thus would not apply to a case where, as in
the current situation, there were "valid existing rights" at the time of
the withdrawal.
108. Miners Blast Utah Monument As 'Election-Year Politics' By Clinton,
INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FED. LANDS, Sept. 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL
8697307 [hereinafter Miners Blast Monument] (quoting letter from
Bruce Babbitt to Sen. Robert Bennett). In addition to the corporate
mining leases, the monument area contained Utah School-Trust Fund
land, which the President assured would be traded for BLM lands of
equal value off the monument site. See Mike Gorell, Monument Is Costly,
Expert Says, SALT LAE TR., Oct. 17, 1996, at Al.
109. See Administration 'Surprises' Andalex, supra note 6.
110. See id.
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ident Clinton not established the area as a national monument,
a favorable EIS would have permitted Andalex to pursue the ad-
ditional permits needed for mining, building roads, and the pro-
posed mining operation."' Despite the fact that BLM continues
to manage the property, the designation of the area as a national
monument may interfere with access and transportation to the
mining area even if the EIS receives a favorable response from
BLM.112 "Andalex won't lose their right to mine,... [t]hey'll just
lose the ability to transport the coal out if the government de-
nies the permits to build roads over protected lands. 113 For
about a decade, Andalex has been attempting to receive a permit
for the underground mining project.11 4 Responding to concerns
of Utah state lawmakers prior to the Proclamation, Secretary
Babbitt stated,
should the company continue to seek permission to move for-
ward with its proposal [for a mine once the area is declared a
national monument], a determination would have to be made
whether the Andalex proposal is inconsistent with the purposes
of the monument, and if so, whether, and to what extent the
company has valid existing rights that would have to be
addressed."115
Secretary Babbitt stated that while Andalex's mining claims
may still be valid following the creation of the national monu-
ment, the company may be required to meet further environ-
mental standards in relation to the monument.'1 6 "You can fore-
see ways in which if mining were to occur, there could be a
significant impact on the objects that are to be protected.... " 1 7
The existing oil and gas leases cover approximately 140,000 acres
of federal land, and 52,000 acres of land leased for coal.118 "An
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. Clinton Carves Out Monument; Utah Lawmakers, Industry Miffed,
MINE REG. REP., Sept. 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8390938 (quoting
Alex Jordan, head of Utah Mining Ass'n).
114. See id.
115. Miners Blast Monument, supra note 108 (quoting Interior Secre-
tary Babbitt).
116. See Joe Salkowski, Act Makes Land in Utah A Monument 1.7 Mil-
lion Acres Saved For Future, Clinton Says, APiz. DAILY STAR, Sept. 19, 1996,
at IA.
117. Id. (quoting White House Spokesman Mike McCurry).
118. See Morris, supra note 101.
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estimated 62 billion tons of high-quality coal is buried under-
neath the harsh terrain - considered the largest unmined coal re-
serve in the country."11 9
Should Andalex be unable to mine on its valid existing leases,
or merely unable to transport any coal from the mine, some le-
gal experts have expressed the view that they may have a takings
claim against the government. If the Proclamation reduces the
economic value of the property (the leases), it may constitute a
taking.120 In addition, regulatory diminishment of adequate ac-
cess to valid mining claims can constitute a taking.121 Thus,
should BLM allow Andalex to mine but severely restrict its ability
to move any coal out of the area by restricting its ability to build
roads and transport the coal, the value of the mine would be se-
verely diminished and Andalex may have a takings claim.122
A trade similar to the one agreed to with PacifiCorp has been
reportedly offered to Andalex. Given the amount of money al-
ready invested by the company in the claim, there have been
doubts expressed by the company that there would be land avail-
able that will give them a return on the money they have already
119. Salkowski, supra note 116. Perhaps the biggest irony over the
mining issue in the Utah monument area is that the reservation will
lock up "62 billion tons of recoverable low-sulfur coal, [which] will lead
to greater air pollution when utilities are forced to burn dirtier coal."
142 CONG. REc. S11,085 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1996) (statement of Senator
Murkowski). Thus, it has been asserted that preserving the area for one
set of environmental motives may cause harm to another set of envi-
ronmental concerns than if a limited mining operation were allowed.
In addition, the senator brought up the point that when we restrict
mining in the U.S. we are more dependant on imported coal from
countries that may not have the technology and environmental protec-
tions as in the U.S. See id.
120. See Andalex Puzzles Over Response to Clinton's Monument Action,
MINE REG. REP., Oct. 7, 1996 [hereinafter Andalex Puzzles] (citing John
Martinez, Associate Law Dean at University of Utah).
121. See Philip F Shuster & Robert F Dierking, Future Prospects For
Mining And Public Land Management: The Federal "Retention-Disposal" Pol-
icy Enters The Twenty-First Century, 26 ENrrL. L. 489, 548-49 (1996). A
thorough discussion of the takings issues implicated by the Utah land
withdrawals is beyond the scope of this Note.
122. For a discussion of regulatory takings, see Ronald H. Rosen-
berg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court Regulatory Takings
Cases On the State Courts: Does The Supreme Court Really Matter?, 6 FoRD-
HAm ENvrL. LJ. 523.(1995).
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invested in the leases.12
In addition to existing coal leases, there are numerous oil
leases in the monument area. In March of 1997, Conoco, who
holds numerous federal and state oil leases, received permission
from the Utah Division of Oil, Gas and Mining to drill an ex-
ploratory well in a section of state-owned land within the monu-
ment area.124 While the first exploratory well did find some natu-
ral gas, it did not yield the large amount of oil the company
expected.12 Any oil and gas find will have to be substantial to
make any mining in this remote area worthwhile.
E. Water Claims
This proclamation does not reserve water as a matter of Federal
law. I direct the Secretary to address in the management plan
the extent to which water is necessary for the proper care and
management of the objects of this monument and the extent
to which further action may be necessary pursuant to Federal
or State law to assure the availability of water.16
The President's statement regarding water rights appears to be
another attempt to limit the effects of the Proclamation. Thus, it
would appear that the language of President Clinton's Proclama-
tion was intended to avoid any later charge that it contained an
implied water right by stating that there was no reserved water
right as a matter of law.127 While no reserved or implied right
would likely be found in this case given the President's state-
ment, the Proclamation also states that the management plan de-
veloped by BLM should evaluate "the extent to which water is
necessary for the proper care and management of the objects of
• 123. See Andalex Puzzles, supra note 115. Andalex has reportedly
abandoned the mine proposal and has begun to negotiate a land swap
with BLM. See Jim Woolf, S. Utah Drilling: Monument May Not Yield Coal,
But Oil Could Yet Fow, SALT LAmE TRm., Mar. 28, 1997, at Al [hereinafter
Woolf, S. Utah Drilling].
124. See Woolf, S. Utah Drilling, supra note 123. "State lands scat-
tered through the monument are not subject to the same strict regula-
tions as surrounding federal lands." Id.
125. See Jim Woolf, Conoco May Drill Again In Monument, SALT [AME
TRIB., Dec. 19, 1997, at B1.
126. Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996).
127. See id. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of water rights
under areas designated monuments under the Antiquities Act.
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this monument .... ",128 Given the fact that the Supreme Court in
Cappaert v. United States129 stated that the implied water right was
limited to "only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the pur-
pose of the reservation, no more," 130 the statements by the Presi-
dent appear to do little to affect the existing law regarding water
rights.13 1 Even if an implied water right was later found, the
courts have already limited the right to only the amount
necessary.
F. Response to the Proclamation
1. Moves to Limit the Act
The response from the public and Congress to President Clin-
ton's Proclamation has been mixed. Environmentalists praised
the act as "without a doubt President Clinton's boldest environ-
mental initiative.' 1 32 However, there have been some serious
charges aimed at the Proclamation and the Act itself. "There has
been no consultation; no hearings; no town meetings; no TV or
radio discussion shows; no input from federal land managers on
the ground; no maps; no boundaries; no nothing."133 While con-
cerns expressed in this statement may be valid, the Antiquities
Act itself does not impose any set procedure to declare a na-
tional monument.1 34 In response to this criticism, President Clin-
ton has directed BLM to "work with state and local governments,
[congressmen] . . . and the senators, and other interests to set
up a land management process that will be good for the people
of Utah and good for Americans." 135
128. Proclamation No. 6920, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (1996).
129. 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
130. Id. at 141, quoting Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600-01
(1963).
131. However, the Congressional Daily reported that "Utah state
water law, rather than Federal, will prevail in the [monument] area."
Utah Delegation, supra note 5. If this is so, it is unclear what effect it
would have on the BLM's decision of how much water is necessary.
132. Salkowski, supra note 116 (quoting Adam Werbach, Sierra
Club President).
133. Utah Delegation, supra note 5 (quoting Utah Senator Orrin
Hatch).
134. See supra Part I.A.
135. Grand Canyon Remarks, supra note 3.
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Another criticism of the Proclamation is the statement that the
President's "use of the relatively obscure 1906 Antiquities Act ap-
pears to be a flagrant move to circumvent the legislative process
concerning the designation of land to be set aside for wilder-
ness." 136 In response to similar complaints from Congress over
President Theodore Roosevelt's Proclamation creating the Jack-
son Hole National Monument, the district court stated that "the
burden is on Congress to pass such remedial legislation as may
obviate any injustice brought about as the power and control
over and disposition of government lands inherently rests in its
Legislative branch." 137 Despite the disapproval, and at times out-
rage, at some of the Proclamations under the Act, no significant
limitations have been put on the Act itself. Even the passage of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act ("FLPMA"),138
which was intended to "restore land withdrawal authority to the
legislature subject to limited delegations to the executive . . .
failed to restrict the President's broad authority under the Antiq-
uities Act." 139 The Proclamation by President Clinton may pro-
voke Congress to break its silence and attempt to restrict the
President's authority under the Act.
Recently, in response to President Clinton's Proclamation, sev-
eral bills have been introduced in Congress aimed at limiting
Presidential power to use the Act to create future monuments.
One such bill, introduced by several senators, is called the Public
Lands Protection Act. 140 The proposed legislation "provides that
no extension or establishment of a national monument can be
undertaken pursuant to the Antiquities Act without full compli-
ance with the National Environmental Policy Act, NEPA, and the
Endangered Species Act, and an affirmative act of Congress." 41
136. Administration "Surprises" Andalex, supra note 6 (quoting Rich-
ard L. Lawson, Nat'l Mining Ass'n President).
137. Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 896 (D. Wyo. 1945).
138. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1207-1784 (1994).
139. Johannsen, supra note 14, at 457.
140. S. 2150, 104th Cong., (1996).
141. 142 CONG. REc. S11,540, S11,552 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Murkowski). The senator states that the reservation
of land was "unquestionably a 'major Federal action' within the mean-
ing of NEPA," and thereby requires an environmental impact state-
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Another proposal to limit presidential power to reserve lands
under the Act would limit the total acreage that may be reserved
to 5,000 acres. 142 This proposal would appear to be in keeping
with the original drafts of the Act, which also limited total reserv-
able acreage. 143
2. Moves to Limit the Effects of the Proclamation Itself
Recently, a bill has been introduced in the Senate to codify all
of the limiting language that President Clinton included in the
Proclamation.1 " This is an indication of how important that lim-
iting language is considered by those who opposed the Presi-
dent's action. The bill ensures that BLM will manage the monu-
ment 45 and the "resources within the [m]onument in
accordance with the principles of multiple use and sustained
yield . . . using the principle of economic and ecological sus-
tainability."'" The bill provides for the preservation of grazing
rights,147 but not for express or implied federal water right,
which will continue to be governed by Utah law.' 48
ment. See id. at S11,552. However, the courts have held that Proclama-
tions under the Antiquities Act do not require an environmental
impact statement required by NEPA. See infra part I.E.1.
142. See What Is The Historical Significance Of The Kaiparowits Pla-
teau 7, 142 CONG. REc. H12,170-01 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996) (Statement
of Sen. Hansen).
143. See supra Part I.A.
144. See S. 357, 105th Cong. (1997).
145. See id. § 4(b)(2).
146. Id. at § 4(a) (2). The bill refers to the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA"), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702-1784
(1994), to define "multiple use" and "sustainable yield." See S. 357,
§ 3(6), (9). FLPMA defines "multiple use" as "the management of the
public lands and their various resource values so that they are utilized
in the combination that will best meet the present and future needs of
the American people. . . ." 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). "Sustainable yield" is
defined as "the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-
level annual or regular periodic output of the various renewable re-
sources of the public lands consistent with multiple use." Id. at
§ 1702(h).
147. See id. § 6(a).
148. See id. § 8.
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Should this bill pass, it would in effect negate many of the
protections anticipated by monument status. The bill's propo-
nents have asserted that it is merely an attempt to hold President
Clinton to his assurances at the time the monument was
created. 49
CONCLUSION
The argument and propaganda which have been circulated in
forums and through the press of the Nation, . . . largely con-
cern a policy of segregating the area for its natural scenery and
inherent beauty as a national playground or, in the alternative,
a policy representing in effect an encroachment upon the
State's sovereignty over lands within its boundaries by adding to
the already large acreage of public lands over which the Fed-
eral Government exercises authority, more lands and more re-
strictive measures, thereby retarding the State's growth and
development.1 °
While this quote may be mistaken for a statement regarding
President Clinton's action declaring the Grand Staircase-Esca-
lante National Monument, it is in fact a statement by the Wyo-
ming District Court regarding the Jackson Hole National Monu-
ment."' In response to arguments for limiting presidential power
under the Act, the court stated that "[s]uch discussions are of
public interest but are only applicable as an appeal for Congres-
sional action."1
5 2
As the brief history of the use and interpretation of the Antiq-
uities Act of 1906 shows, President Clinton's Proclamation creat-
ing the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument was not
unusual or the largest reservation under the Act. It seems likely,
given the judicial precedents approving similar proclamations,
that any court challenge would probably fail. The only recourse
that may serve to limit any future uses of the Act would be Con-
gressional action. The courts have repeatedly stated that Con-
gressional inaction in limiting presidential authority under the
Act indicates tacit approval of the expansion of the Act beyond
the original intent.'5 3 Thus, should the proposed legislation pass,
149. See 143 CONG. REC. S1571 (1997) (statement of Sen. Bennett).
150. Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 896-97 (D. Wyo. 1945).
151. See id.
152. Id. at 897.
153. See id. at 896-97.
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it would affect future reservations under the Act.
With regard to the effects upon the uses of the land within the
new monument area in Utah, the qualifying language and the
continued management of the land by BLM would indicate that
there may be little change. As has been stated, grazing and recre-
ational uses will not be limited.154 The only real question appears
to be the future of the coal, oil and gas development leases. Al-
though the Proclamation does not explicitly invalidate the min-
ing claims, the use and value of the claims could be limited
should BLM choose to restrict access to the areas by prohibiting
the building of roads. BLM has three years to develop a manage-
ment plan for the area, and has not completely ruled out min-
ing. As discussed, the legislation introduced in Congress that
would codify the President's limiting instructions would in fact
eliminate many of the protections monument status would pro-
vide. As the exploratory drilling shows, it is possible that mineral
exploration will be allowed at least for pre-existing leases. There
are, however, many obstacles in the form of new regulations and
operating costs that may discourage leaseholders from pursuing
their claims.
In sum, the future of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument is unclear. Should Congress pass the proposed legisla-
tion, however, the greatest impact of the President's creation of
this monument may be upon the Antiquities Act itself.
154. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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